https://doi.org/10.4081/mem.2006.353

Le buone ragioni del soggettivismo etico e i suoi errori. Note su bioetica, relativismo e metafisica

V. 55 N. 3 (2006)
Pubblicato: giugno 30, 2006
Bioetica, relativismo, metafisica / Bioethics, relativism, metaphysics
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Autori

Adriano Pessina
adriano.pessina@unicatt.it
Professore Straordinario di Filosofia morale, Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (UCSC), Milano, Italy.
Soggettivismo etico e relativismo della conoscenza fanno spesso da sfondo ai dibattiti in bioetica. Il soggettivismo rivendica una sorta di attività legislatrice della ragione umana che, almeno in parte, va accolta. Il singolo uomo ha il dovere di legiferare in merito alla promozione delle finalità che lo interpellano, ma il criterio non può essere soggettivo: per conoscere il bene dell'uomo si deve, infatti, sapere chi è l'uomo. Soltanto nella conoscenza della struttura antropologica umana si può trovare una risposta adeguata alle esigenze del soggetto. Al soggettivismo, allora, si deve rispondere con l'argomento della personalizzazione della vita morale. L'uomo deve realizzare un bene in sè facendolo diventare nel concreto bene per lui. Ma il nodo teorico che resta da affrontare è la possibilità pratica e teorica di rispondere alla domanda "chi è l'uomo" senza fare i conti con la metafisica. Il nesso tra etica e metafisica non si pone secondo la logica della remunerazione o del comando estrinseci, ma come determinazione del senso stesso della condizione umana. La metafisica va pensata come ciò che restituisce alla temporalità il suo stesso significato storico.
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Ethical subjectivism and relativism of knowledge are often the setting of debates on bioethics. The subjectivism vindicates a kind of legislative activity of the human reason that, at least partly, must be welcomed. The single man has duty to legislate regarding the promotion of finalities that consult him, but the criterion can not be subjective: to know the good of the man, in fact, ones must know who the man is. A suitable answer to the demands of the subject can be found only in the knowledge of the human anthropological structure. Ones must answer to subjectivism with the matter of the personalization of moral life. The man must realize a good in oneself making it becoming a good for him in the concrete. But the theoretical knot that stays to face is the practical and theoretical possibility to answer to the question "who is the man" without making the accounts with the metaphysics. The connection between ethics and metaphysics doesn't set according to the logic of the extrinsic remuneration or the command, but as determination of the sense itself of human condition. Metaphysics must be thought like what it returns its same historical meaning to temporality.

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Come citare

Pessina, A. (2006). Le buone ragioni del soggettivismo etico e i suoi errori. Note su bioetica, relativismo e metafisica. Medicina E Morale, 55(3). https://doi.org/10.4081/mem.2006.353

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