Legge di Hume e fallacia naturalistica: i dogmi del positivismo logico
Published: June 30, 2006
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All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
Authors
Dottore in filosofia, Dottoranda di Ricerca in Bioetica, Facoltà di Medicina e Chirurgia
"A. Gemelli", Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, Roma, Italy.
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Hume's Law and Moore's critique of the naturalistic fallacy were used as the basis for a non-cognitive ethic in order to affirm that values cannot be known rationally, but only intuitively or through the subjective sphere of the emotions. Behind the facts/values dichotomy of Hume's Law there is a reductive conception of reality, which is considered solely as a collection of quantifiable, measurable and verifiable facts (the neo-positive principle of verification). On top of the facts/values dichotomy, - in any analytic context - there is also the analytic/synthetic dichotomy: analytic propositions (logical) have no need of verification (they are always true), while synthetic propositions are subject to the verification of experience and thus can be said to be true or false. From this rigid scheme emerged the ethical propositions that there cannot be either truth nor falsehood. According to H. Putnam, the same scientific discoveries, which have given rise to hypotheses about aspects of reality which are not directly verifiable, have led to the end of both the analytic/synthetic dichotomy and the facts/values dichotomy, since, as Quine has shown, one cannot undertake research without epistemological values. In the analytic field, the neo-positive positions have been superseded by pragmatism, in which there is no separation between facts and values and one cannot speak of objectivity in ethics, but only of a weak, inter-subjective objectivity, which carries with it the risk of confusing the "good" with the "useful". The dogma of the facts/values dichotomy has been superseded, but not that of the denial of metaphysics (with the exception of so-called "analytic Thomism"). Bioethics, which is concerned with life issues that are subject to technology and science can help not only to go beyond the facts/values dichotomy, but to recover a unity of meaning in which existential reason is not opposed to metaphysical reason: to describe the complexity of life one needs to have tools with which to see its shape and its finality.
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